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Abstract 
Insight is commonly viewed as originating from the restructuring of a mental 
representation. Distributed cognition frameworks such as the Systemic Thinking 
Model (SysTM, Vallée-Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2017), however, assumes 
that information processing can be transformed when it is distributed across mental 
and material resources. The experiments reported here investigated whether 
interactivity enhanced incubation effects with the Cheap Necklace Problem. 
Participants attempted to solve the problem in a low interactivity condition with pen 
and paper or in a high interactivity condition with a set of metal chains. Performance 
was substantially better in a task environment that fostered a higher degree of 
interactivity at Time 1. There was evidence of an incubation effect as participants 
significantly improved in performance after a two-week gap, particularly in the high 
interactivity condition. Experiment 2 shows that the context within which people can 
enact their thinking following incubation is key to improve problem solving 
performance. When the problem presentation changed after a two-week gap (low 
interactivity to high interactivity or high interactivity to low interactivity), 
performance only improved for those who worked on a highly interactive task at Time 
2. Taken together these findings underscore the importance of adopting a systemic 
perspective when investigating incubation effects in problem solving. 
Keywords: Interactivity, insight problem solving, incubation. 
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Incubation and Interactivity in Insight Problem Solving 
 
In general day-to-day activities, problems range in nature and complexity. 
Different strategies are used in order to solve these problems based on previous 
experience, seeking help from others, utilizing information and tools immediately 
available, and so on. Traditionally, psychologists classify problems into two broad 
categories: transformation and insight. Transformation problems are well-defined 
with a clear specified goal, such as the Tower of Hanoi. The problem space identifies 
the sequence of steps that transforms the problem from the initial state to the goal 
state. By contrast, insight problems are less well defined, and are formulated in a 
manner that derails participants’ ability to anticipate a path to solution.  
The Cheap Necklace Problem (CNP) is one such insight problem. Introduced by 
Silveira (1971), the CNP is a difficult problem with successful performance often less 
than 10% (Fioratou & Cowley, 2009; Fioratou, Flin, & Glavin, 2010; Silveira, 1971). 
In its standard form, participants are presented with a diagram of four chains each 
consisting of three-links, alongside a diagram of a complete 12-link necklace. Figure 
1 presents a slightly modified version wherein actual chains are shown in a 
photograph rather than illustrated with a schematic diagram. Participants are asked to 
reconstruct the necklace by connecting the four separate chains at a cost: namely 2¢ to 
open a link, 3¢ to close a link, with a maximum spend of 15¢. It is not possible to 
solve this task by simply connecting the ends of each chain, as this will exceed the 
15¢ allowed. Joining the ends of each chain suggests optimal progress towards the 
solution as the initial move of joining two chains together only cost 5¢, yet makes half 
of the necklace. This path, however, leads to a dead-end as it will eventually cost 20¢. 
Although joining the ends of the chains does not work, participants have been 
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observed to persevere with this strategy (Chu, Dewald & Chronicle, 2007). The 
solution requires all the links in one chain to be opened at a cost of 6¢, then 
connecting the remaining three chains together using those open links, at a cost of 9¢. 
The solution to break up the chain with the aim of making a complete necklace is 
counterintuitive.  
 
 
Figure 1. Given and goal states in the Cheap Necklace Problem. 
Incubation 
When struggling to solve a problem, it may pay off to leave it aside for some 
time before attempting to discover a solution. In problem solving research, the initial 
period of unsuccessful labour is sometimes referred as a ‘preparation’ phase and the 
interpolated break period the ‘incubation’ phase (Wallas, 1926). There is evidence 
that taking a break from the CNP after struggling to solve it results in higher solution 
rates later. Silveira (1971, Experiment 2) sought to establish whether the difficult 
CNP would be made easier when delays were placed between an initial intense period 
of working on the problem and a subsequent attempt at completing it. In her study, 
participants were shown the CNP on a sheet of paper with a pencil. They were told 
they were free to make notes on the paper while they thought about the problem. They 
were also made aware that they would be interrupted, but were not told when. 
Thirteen minutes after reaching an impasse (for example, closing a circle of chains 
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and realising they would go over budget), participants were interrupted to complete a 
short questionnaire about their performance. A control group could resume work on 
the problem as soon as the questionnaire was completed. The experimental group was 
given a 4-hour break before resuming work on the CNP. After this incubation period, 
they were given the same sheet they had previously been working with and continued 
searching for a solution. Participants across all conditions performed well in the task, 
with successful performance at 38%, and 81% respectively. Overall successful 
performance was very high in this study in comparison to subsequent studies on the 
CNP, which may be explained by the extended period of time people were allowed to 
work on the problem (González-Vallejo, Lassiter, Bellezza, & Lindberg, 2008). 
Sio and Ormerod’s (2009) meta-analysis examined incubation effects for three 
types of problems, creative (e.g., unusual uses test), visual insight problems (of which 
the CNP is an example, see Sio & Ormerod, p. 113), and linguistic insight problems 
(e.g., remote associate problems). Their meta-analysis reported significant incubation 
effects for all three types of problems. The main moderator of incubation effects for 
visual insight problems was the length of the preparation phase. Thus, a strong 
incubation effects is observed the longer a participant struggles to solve the problem 
before the interpolated break period.  
Incubation in tasks such as the CNP may help problem-solving through 
restructuring following impasse (MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001). 
Restructuring is conceived as the reorganisation of a reasoner’s mental representation 
in a more productive form, enabling a more adequate use of the problem information 
to reach a solution (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). Restructuring can proceed through 
switching search strategies for possible moves (e.g., MacGregor et al., 2001), relaxing 
constraints on possible moves as well as decomposing familiar patterns of features or 
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“chunks” (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson Haider & Rhenius, 1999); some of these mental 
processes may be unconscious rather than reflecting a conscious deliberate analysis of 
the problem elements. In addition, withdrawing attention from a problem that resists a 
solution (and its concomitant incorrect representation) can enhance solution rates 
once the problem is revisited (Segal, 2004, Sio & Ormerod, 2009). One never steps 
into the same idea twice (to adapt Ingold, 2014) and returning to the problem after a 
delay may help defuse incorrect assumptions and encourage a different perspective on 
the problem 
Breaking one of the four chains into three separate links is the breakthrough 
required to solve the CNP problem. The difficulty in solving this problem is often 
attributed to the (mental) representation of the small chains as tight perceptual chunks. 
From the perspective of Ohlsson’s (1992) Representational Change Theory, for 
instance, a solution is more likely achieved if the representation is restructured such 
that individuated links are segmented and hence can be decomposed. Alternatively, 
the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress theory (Chu et al., 2007) proposes that hints 
aimed at defusing the first obvious move—namely to connect two chains to form half 
the necklace—may help reasoners solve the problem. In a series of experiments, Chu 
et al. established that a mix of hints to prevent selecting the obvious first move as well 
as presenting one of the four chains as made up of three-links each of a separate 
colour was most efficient in improving solution rates. These findings suggest that 
both perceptual chunking and criterion for satisfactory progress contribute to the 
impasse.  
Cognitive Interactivity and the Systemic Thinking Model (SysTM) 
Despite being worded as an active task where links are opened and closed, the 
CNP problem is traditionally offered as a pen and paper exercise. Yet, outside the 
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psychologist’s laboratory, situations that require problem solving are rarely 
encountered in this manner. Anthropologists, cognitive archaeologists, human factors 
engineers and designers are keenly aware of the role of artefacts in supporting and 
transforming thinking (e.g., Baber, Chemero, & Hall, 2017; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 
2013; Malafouris, 2014; Norman, 1993; Toon, 2011). Recently, the systemic thinking 
model (SysTM, Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015; Vallée-
Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2017) was developed to account for interactivity, 
defined as the processes involved when thinking and problem-solving take place in 
environments where people and things exert a reciprocal influence upon one another. 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Systemic Thinking Model (SysTM, adapted from Vallée-Tourangeau & 
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2017) 
 
SysTM highlights that when participants can act directly upon the material 
presentation of the information, thinking no longer results exclusively from the 
deductive processing of a mental representation (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, 
& Hinton, 1986). Rather solutions to problems emerge from a situated agent-
environment ecosystem; that is, from an agent situated in, interacting with, and being 
influenced by her physical environment.  Extending our conception of cognitive 
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activity beyond the remits of deductive mental processing allows introducing a 
different type of information processing, namely inductive processing, which may 
also transform, and possibly augment, thinking performance (Kirsh, 2017). 
Specifically, SysTM proposes that enabling the physical manipulation of one’s 
immediate environment supports the perception of “micro-affordances” (Ellis & 
Tucker, 2000), or possible actions within one’s environment, that are perceived 
without being mediated by mental representations. As individuals act upon these 
perceived micro-affordances (e.g., by grasping a chain), they transform the perceptual 
input. This affordance-driven physical rearrangement allows cognition to proceed 
through an inductive processing loop where the physical manipulation of the material 
layout without a clear mental plan multiplies the opportunities to achieve different 
and potentially fruitful perceptual perspectives. 
It follows that agent-environment ecosystems can be characterised by the level 
of interactivity they afford, that is, the extent to which the cognitive agent has the 
opportunity to transform the material instantiation of a cognitive task and, conversely, 
to be influenced by the task’s changing perceptual layout. One of the key predictions 
of SysTM is, therefore, that increasing the opportunities to physically manipulate 
information through highly interactive environments will increase the likelihood of 
successful problem solving. 
Consistent with this view, increasing opportunities to interact with the problem 
material has been shown to increase performance with matchstick algebra problems 
(Weller, Villejoubert, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2011) as well as the CNP (Fioratou & 
Cowley, 2009). To measure the impact of increasing interactivity in the CNP, 
Fioratou and Cowley (2009) compared two problem versions:  an “abstract” paper-
and-pencil version where participants were given a pen and could draw possible 
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solutions and a “concrete (physical)” version where participants were presented with 
opening and closing metal chains to work on the problem. In line with the SysTM 
terminology, we will thereafter distinguish these versions by the level of interactivity 
they afford, and refer to them as “low-interactivity” and “high-interactivity” versions, 
respectively. With 10 minutes to reach a solution, fewer than 3% of the participants 
solved the problem with the low-interactivity version. This performance rate rose to 
30% when participants were given the opportunity to interact with a physical model 
of the problem in the high-interactivity version. To summarise, when thinking can be 
reflected and prompted by changes in the world, the resulting perceptual change may 
highlight cues to new strategies, thus enabling better planning and efficiency in 
progressing towards a solution (Vallée-Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2017; 
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014; Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015). 
Interactivity and Incubation 
Sio and Ormerod (2009) identify six possible moderators of incubation effects 
in problem solving, including length of the preparation phase, and nature of the 
interpolated task (see pp. 95-97); however they do not consider the interactive nature 
of the task environment. Rather their perspective on problem solving is couched in 
cognitive terms aimed at eventually developing a ‘computational model of insight 
problem solving’ (p. 110), moderated by psychometric variables such as executive 
function and working memory capacity. Yet, as we mentioned above, another way to 
increase performance is to increase the interactivity afforded by the task presentation 
by giving participants the opportunity to manipulate actual chains. Participants in 
Silveira’s (1971) experiment did not have access to a material presentation of the 
cheap necklace. Thus, whether and how incubation effects may interact with higher 
degrees of task interactivity remains to be established.  
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Following the SysTM perspective, we can assume that working on a problem 
that offers limited opportunities for manipulating the task materials—as in the low-
interactivity “pen-and-paper” version of the task—cognition will be constrained to 
follow deductive processing loops where actions (e.g., symbolic marks on the paper) 
proceed from a mentally represented plan. An unproductive task representation may 
lead to an impasse and restructuring may be hindered by the relative invariance of the 
informational input. Consider, by contrast, an information input which affords 
manipulation—as in the high-interactivity version mentioned above. Each 
manipulation of the metal chains has the potential to reconfigure the perceptual input. 
Akin to reasoners working on the low-interactivity version of the CNP, those engaged 
in interactive manipulation of metal chains in the high-interactivity version may 
restructure an unproductive task representation through planned hypothetico-
deductive processing. The increased level of interactivity, however, also enables 
unplanned inductive processing. This does not only create more opportunities to 
identify a productive path to solution while they are working on the task, it also 
fosters a richer, experiential and multisensory representation of the task information. 
This more dynamic and distributed representation may facilitate the discovery of new 
strategies and facilitate the relaxation of unproductive interpretations and constraints. 
Increased interactivity, we thus hypothesize, may favour productive restructuring 
when participants who failed to solve the problem at their first attempt, may now be 
more likely to solve it on a second attempt after taking a break from working on the 
problem. In other words, an incubation effect may be more strongly manifested in a 
context that offers opportunities for action. 
The SysTM perspective does not directly address whether incubation might be 
the product of largely deliberate conscious processing or unconscious processing-such 
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as spread of activation or selective forgetting during the interpolated break. This is 
largely because the debate in its current form (e.g., Sio & Ormerod, 2009, pp. 94-95) 
is couched in largely computationalist terms: in those accounts, the issue is not 
whether insight is mediated by physical processing in one’s immediate environment 
but rather whether it occurs through mental unconscious processes or mental 
conscious processes. In other words, the current debate is formulated in a manner that 
validates rather than challenges commitments to the traditional mentalist framework. 
This being noted, the SysTM perspective offers the opportunity to broaden the debate 
by exploring how inductive processing and unplanned physical actions contribute to 
insight. Thus, in addition to exploring the impact of interactivity on solving the CNP, 
the experiments reported here tested the prediction that participants who failed to 
solve the problem at Time 1, would be more likely to solve it after a delay when they 
worked on the problem in a high interactivity condition compared to those who 
returned to work on the problem in a low interactivity task environment. 
Operationalising incubation under laboratory conditions often proceeds with an 
intervening task that encourages reasoners to abandon working on the primary solving 
task for a short period of time, usually a few minutes (e.g., Patrick, 1986; Segal, 2004; 
Silveira, 1971), although it is sometimes difficult to determine the exact length of the 
incubation period (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). Anecdotal examples of incubation in 
science and the arts, however, span much longer periods of time, weeks or months 
(Weisberg, 2014). We were thus interested to explore the impact of an incubation 
period that spanned weeks rather than minutes. Although it may be more difficult to 
control the nature of the activities that participants engage in during that period, it 
offers a test that is much closer to incubation as it manifests outside the psychologist’s 
laboratory.  
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Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine whether interactivity would moderate 
incubation in the CNP task. Participants worked on the CNP either in a low or high 
interactivity condition. Based on previous findings, we expected performance to be 
influenced by the degree of interactivity afforded by the task environment: 
manipulating the physical elements of the problem should yield a higher solution rate 
than simulating moves mentally. Our main objective, however, was to test whether a 
higher degree of interactivity would promote a more pronounced incubation effect 
when participants returned to the problem after a substantial delay.  
In addition to measuring solution rates, we also explored how solution latencies 
may be affected by increasing interactivity, as well as whether participants’ memory 
abilities may moderate the impact of increasing interactivity. There is increasing 
evidence to suggest that working memory is implicated in insight problem solving 
(e.g., Chudersky, 2014). However, tests and measures of working memory and 
problem solving performance that inform correlational analyses usually proceed in 
task environments that afford little or no interactivity. Interacting with a physical 
model of the problem has been shown to functionally enhance a participant’s working 
memory resources when working on a mental arithmetic task, since the physical 
model stores information and cues actions that may be more difficult to rehearse and 
simulate mentally (Vallée-Tourangeau, Sirota, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2016a). We 
were interested to determine the extent to which working memory was also implicated 
in performance on the CNP task, and whether its implication depended on the level of 
interactivity afforded by the task.  
We also developed a long-term memory task based on the material reported in 
Roediger and Karpicke (2006); participants were presented with a short description of 
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the Sun––qua celestial body–– and were tested for their memory of that material at 
Time 1 and again at Time 2, computing a difference score to determine the rate of 
memory decline. This measure was designed to explore whether a long-term memory 
index discriminated between solvers and non-solvers at Time 2. This was exploratory 
because we were not in a position to make a specific prediction: On the one hand, 
better long term memory skills may make it easier for participants to remember 
strategies employed at Time 1, but not whether these were successful or not. On the 
other hand, better memory skills may help participants remember more quickly what 
strategies were unsuccessful and hence support their dismissal. 
Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
Sixty-three undergraduate and postgraduate psychology students (53 females) 
volunteered to participate in exchange for course credits (Mage = 22.05, SD = 4.05). 
All participants were naïve to the CNP prior to participation. 
Materials 
A six-page problem pack was given to participants at both Times 1 and 2. The 
packs included an informed consent form, a short informative article about the Sun 
(only given at Time 1), the CNP with instructions and a set of four metal chains 
consisting of three-links which could be opened and closed by screwing the top of 
each link for participants in the high interactivity condition. Low interactivity 
participants were presented the task on a sheet of paper, including a picture of the 
chains, with the problem written at the top and lined space to work on a solution 
below.  
Design and Procedure 
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This experiment employed a 2 × 2 mixed design, where the between-subjects 
factor was level of interactivity (low interactivity vs. high interactivity) and time as a 
repeated measures factor (Time 1 vs. Time 2). At Time 1 participants initially 
attempted to solve the CNP in either a low interactivity or high interactivity, which 
they again attempted in the same interactivity condition at Time 2, two weeks later. 
All testing was conducted individually in a quiet room. At Time 1, participants 
were given 5 minutes to read a short summary about the Sun that contained 30 
separate ideas written in 256 words (taken from Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). They 
were then presented with the CNP and the instructions were read aloud by the 
researcher. The picture of the CNP (as illustrated in Figure 1) was shown to 
participants in both conditions. In both interactivity conditions, participants had up to 
30 minutes to complete the task, with the option to stop whenever they chose. Once 
they were ready to announce their answer to the problem, participants in both 
interactivity conditions were asked to write it down and the time taken to completion 
was noted. Participants were then given a recall sheet, and were given five minutes to 
recall in either full sentences or bullet-points any information they could remember 
from the short article they read before attempting the CNP. Participants were then 
debriefed, but no feedback on performance was given. At this time, they were asked 
to return to the lab two weeks later, and not to discuss or work on the CNP during that 
period. 
Two weeks later, participants were given 5 minutes at the start of the session to 
note anything they could remember from the short description of the Sun presented at 
Time 1. Long-term memory performance was indexed by taking the difference in the 
number of distinct ideas recalled at Time 1 and Time 2: The greater the difference in 
recall, the sharper the decline in memory performance at Time 2. They were then 
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presented with the CNP and given 30 minutes to solve the problem. Once they noted 
their solution, the time taken to complete the task was noted. A computation span (C-
Span) working memory task was then presented to the participants (adapted from 
Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001). In the C-Span participants solved a series of simple 
arithmetic expressions. The series were composed of two to six expressions. At the 
end of each series, participants were asked to remember the second number for each 
expression presented in their order of presentation. 
Experiment 1: Results 
CNP Performance  
Solution Rates. Successful performance was classified using Silveira’s (1971) 
solution of deconstructing one chain into three-links at a cost of 6¢, and using those 
three-separate links to combine the remaining three chains into a single circle at a cost 
of 9¢. Solution rates are reported in Table 1: Twelve (or 43%) of the participants 
solved the problem in the high interactivity condition at Time 1, while two (or 6%) 
solved the problem in the low interactivity condition; the difference in solution rates 
was significant, 2(1, N = 63) = 12.42, p < .001. At Time 2, all the participants who 
solved the problem at Time 1, in both interactivity conditions, offered a correct 
solution. Of the 16 participants who had not solved the problem in the high 
interactivity condition at Time 1, seven (or 43%) solved it at Time 2; of the 33 
participants who were unable to solve the problem in the low interactivity condition at 
Time 1, five (or 15%) solved it at Time 2; the difference was significant, 2(1, N = 
49) = 4.77, p = .029. Because one of the four cells of the contingency table had 
expected frequencies lower than five we also conducted a Fisher exact test, which was 
significant, p = .040, and supported the initial chi square test. 
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Table 1 
Solution Frequencies in the Low and High Interactivity Conditions at Times 1 and 2, 
along with Solution Latencies (in Seconds), Long Term Memory Performance (LTM; 
Indexed as the Difference in Recall Accuracy at Time 2), and Working Memory 
Capacity (C-Span). 
 
Solution Latencies. Latency to solution were considerably lower at Time 2 
compared to Time 1 for those participants who had solved the problem at Time 1 (see 
Table 1). In a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA, the main effect of time was significant, F(1, 12) 
= 26.8, p < .001, but the main effect of level of interactivity, F < 1, and the interaction 
between time and interactivity, F < 1, were not. If the latencies for the participants 
who only solved the problem at Time 2 are compared with the latencies for those who 
solved the problem at Time 1, the main effect of time was significant, F(1, 21) = 11.1, 
p = .003, but the main effect of interactivity, F < 1, and the interaction between time 
and levels of interactivity, were not significant, F(1, 21) = 2.28, p = .146. 
Time 1
Freq 2 33 12 16
% 6% 94% 43% 57%
Latency to Solution
M 806.5 787.3
SD 333.0 247.0
Time 2 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Freq 2 0 5 28 12 0 7 9
% 100% 0% 15% 85% 100% 0% 44% 56%
Latency to Solution
M 227.5 371.4 315.3 496.9
SD 108.2 227.5 155.0 218.9
LTM index
M -2.5 -4.0 -3.1 -4.1 -2.6 -4.1
SD 0.7 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.8
C-Span
M 31.5 16.0 11.6 22.0 24.3 16.1
SD 10.6 8.3 7.7 11.0 8.8 9.9
Yes No Yes
Low Interactivity
No
High Interactivity
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Of the unsuccessful participants in the low interactivity condition, seven 
participants persevered for 30 minutes. In the high interactivity condition, among the 
16 unsuccessful participants, three worked on the problem for 30 minutes. However, a 
better measure of diligence might be offered by the time spent on the problem by 
those who gave up before the allocated 30 minutes. Participants who gave up working 
on the problem did so quicker in the low interactivity (M = 521s, SD = 472) than in 
the high interactivity (M = 764s, SD = 447) condition, a marginally significant 
difference, t(37) = - 1.99, p =.054. In light of the fact that the length of the preparation 
phase was identified as a significant moderator of incubation effects in Sio and 
Ormerod’s (2009) meta-analysis, time working on the problem for the unsuccessful 
participants at Time 1 might predict success at Time 2, independent of the level of 
interactivity. And while participants who first solved the problem at Time 2, spent on 
average 4 additional minutes working on the problem during Time 1 (M = 1029.0, SD 
= 632.8) compared to those who did not solve the problem at Time 2 (M = 787.5, SD 
= 571.1) this difference was not significant, t(47) = 1.24 , p = .221.  
Long-term and Working Memory Performance 
Participants’ long term memory was indexed on the basis of difference in their 
ability to recall separate ideas expressed in the Sun vignette at Times 1 and 2; the 
mean decline in performance is reported for participants who solved and did not solve 
the problem at Time 2 in both interactivity conditions in Table 1. Memory decline 
was constant across participants in both conditions and as a function of having solved 
the problem. A 2(solved, did not solve) × 2(low, high interactivity) between subjects 
ANOVA confirmed those impressions: the main effects of having solved the problem, 
F < 1, and interactivity, F < 1, were not significant, nor was the interaction, F(1, 59) = 
1.54, p = .220.  
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Participants’ working memory capacity as gauged by their performance on a 
computation span test is reported in Table 1. Participants who solved the problem 
generally had higher C-Span scores than those who did not solve the problem, and 
this pattern was observed in both interactivity conditions. In a 2x2 between-subjects 
ANOVA, those who solved the problem (M = 21.3, SD = 9.0) scored significantly 
higher on the C-Span than those who did not (M = 14.1, SD =8.0), F(1, 59) = 6.84, p 
= .011, but working memory capacity did not differ between participants in the high 
interactivity condition (M = 20.7, SD = 10.3) and low interactivity condition (M = 
13.3, SD = 8.9), F(1, 59) = 1.64, p =.206; the interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
Experiment 1: Discussion 
Experiment 1 sought to explore the impact of interactivity on the ability to solve 
the CNP as well as the degree of incubation manifested in performance at Time 2 as a 
function of the level of interactivity. The CNP is a difficult problem, and the solution 
rates observed here are similar to those reported previously (e.g., Fioratou & Cowley, 
2009; Fioratou, Flin, & Glavin, 2010; Silveira, 1971). Upon first encounter in the low 
interactivity condition only two participants could find the solution. This low solution 
rate is in part explained by how quickly participants gave up on the task: Generally, 
participants were less diligent in the low interactivity condition.  
Performance on the CNP was significantly better when participants could use 
and manipulate tangible chains in the high interactivity condition, than when 
restricted to just a pen and paper to find the solution. Higher working memory 
capacity, however, was associated with a higher solution rates in both conditions, a 
finding that lends support to the role of working-memory in insight problem solving. 
More participants completed the CNP at Time 2, and those participants who 
completed the task successfully on both attempts were quicker to find the solution 
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during their second attempt. As we had anticipated, the incubation effect was 
distinctly stronger in the high interactivity condition: participants who did not solve 
the problem at Time 1 in the high interactivity condition were more likely to solve the 
problem at Time 2 than the unsuccessful participants in the low interactivity condition 
at Time 1. Thus, incubation effects were more clearly manifested in a high 
interactivity context. In addition, performance at Time 2 could not be explained in 
terms of better long-term memory; memory decline was similar in both conditions.  
We assumed higher levels of interactivity in the initial context would provide 
multiple opportunities for unplanned interactions, thus resulting in a richer, more 
dynamic initial representation of the task in terms of possible moves and possible 
paths to solution. However, it remains to be established whether the greater increase 
in solution rates at Time 2 with the high-interactivity version of the CNP is driven by 
restructuration through incubation on a richer, more dynamic representation of the 
task fostered at Time 1 (an incubation-driven performance improvement) or by 
restructuration through enactment on the high-interactivity version of the CNP at 
Time 2 (an enactment-driven performance improvement). If the richness of the initial 
representation is indeed key to the incubation effect, performance after incubation 
should therefore remain high when people work on the high-interactivity version at 
Time 1, and are presented with the paper-and-pencil version at Time 2. Conversely, 
when presented with the paper-and-pencil at Time 1, the resulting initial 
representation should be less amenable to restructuration and thus offer limited 
advantage to improve performance at Time 2. There is an alternative possibility, 
however: it may be that incubation effects are realised in situ. If this is the case, we 
should expect that working within a context with limited action possibilities at Time 2 
(i.e., using the paper-and-pencil CNP version) would impede performance 
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improvement even if reasoners were able to interact with a high-interactivity version 
at Time 1. Conversely, a context replete with action possibilities (i.e., using the high-
interactivity CNP version) at Time 2 should allow performance to leap up. These 
conflicting predictions are summarised in Figure 3 and were tested in Experiment 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. Incubation-driven vs. Enactment-driven expected performance rise at Time 
2. Time 1 = Initial Interactivity level, Time 2 = Final Interactivity level.  
1
Denotes small (+) or large (++) increase in performance observed in Experiment 1. 
2
Denotes small (+) or large (++) increase in performance expected in Experiment 2, 
under the (a) incubation-driven or the (b) enactment-driven hypothesis, respectively.  
 
Experiment 2: Method 
Participants 
Sixty-one undergraduate and postgraduate psychology students (56 females) 
were recruited to participate in exchange for course credits (Mage = 21.43, SD = 4.21). 
All participants were naïve to the CNP prior to participation. 
Materials 
The same materials from Experiment 1 were used. 
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Design and Procedure 
Experiment 2 employed a 2  2 mixed design, with time as a repeated measures 
factor and interactivity level switch as a between subjects factor (low interactivity at 
Time 1 switched to high interactivity at Time 2 vs. high interactivity at Time 1 
switched to low interactivity at Time 2). A similar procedure as Experiment 1 was 
employed aside from one key change: the interactivity level switch for participants at 
Time 2.  
Experiment 2: Results 
CNP Performance  
Solution Rates. As in Experiment 1, successful performance was classified 
using Silveira’s (1971) solution criterion. Solution rates are reported in Table 2: 
Fourteen (or 41%) of the participants solved the problem in the high interactivity 
condition at Time 1, while four (or 15%) solved the problem in the low interactivity 
condition; the difference in solution rates was significant, 2(1, N = 55) = 5.03, p = 
.025; this pattern of solution rates replicates the pattern observed at Time 1 in 
Experiment 1. At Time 2, all 14 participants who solved the problem in the high 
interactivity at Time 1, solved the problem in the low interactivity condition. Among 
the remaining 20 participants who had not solved it at Time 1 in the high interactivity 
condition, only one (or 5%) solved the problem in the low interactivity condition at 
Time 2. All four participants who solved the problem in the low interactivity at Time 
1, solved it in the high interactivity condition at Time 2; of the remaining 23 who did 
not solve the problem in the low interactivity condition at Time 1, 14 (or 61%) now 
solved the problem when they switched to the high interactivity condition at Time 2.  
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Table 2 
Solution Frequencies in the Low and High Interactivity Conditions at Time 1 and 2, 
along with Solution Latencies, Long Term Memory Performance (LTM; Indexed as 
the Difference in Recall Accuracy at Time 2), and Working Memory Capacity (C-
Span). 
 
The switch in the level of interactivity substantially affected performance. This 
is particularly clearly revealed on the basis of cross experiment comparisons. Thus, of 
the participants who did not solve the CNP in a low interactivity condition in 
Experiment 1 at Time 1, 5 (or 15%) solved the same version of the problem at Time 
2. In Experiment 2, of the participants who did not solve the low interactivity version 
of the problem at Time 1, 14 (or 61%) subsequently solved the problem in the high 
interactivity condition at Time 2. Thus, incubation following the paper-and-pencil 
task (low interactivity) led to significantly higher rate of solution in a highly 
interactive realisation context, 2(1, N = 56) = 12.64, p < .001. Conversely, the switch 
to a low interactivity condition for participants who started in a high interactivity 
Time 1
Freq 4 23 14 20
% 15% 85% 41% 57%
Latency to Solution
M 755.5 1107.6
SD 306.6 408.6
Time 2
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Freq 4 0 14 9 14 0 1 19
% 100% 0% 61% 39% 100% 0% 5% 95%
Latency to Solution
M 278.8 810.2 196.9 1094.0
SD 148.1 326.1 153.6
LTM index
M -2.5 -3.6 -4.6 -3.7 -2.0 -4.9
SD 1.3 1.5 1.3 2.2 3.3
C-Span
M 23.0 25.7 23.3 19.4 20.0 16.6
SD 10.2 10.2 10.0 7.6 29.0
High Interactivity Low Interactivity
Low Interactivity High Interactivity
Yes No Yes No
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condition depressed performance considerably. Of the 20 participants who failed to 
solve the problem at Time 1 in Experiment 2 in the high interactivity condition, only 
1 (or 5%) solved it at Time 2 in the low interactivity condition. In Experiment 1, of 
the 16 participants who had not solved the problem at Time 1 in the high interactivity 
condition, 7 (or 44%) solved it at Time 2. In other words, incubation following the 
high-interactivity task version resulted in a significantly lower rate of solution in the 
“paper-and-pencil” low-interactivity realisation context, 2(1, N = 36) = 7.22, p = 
.007. Because two of the four cells of the contingency table had expected frequencies 
lower than 5 we also conducted a Fisher exact test, which was significant, p = .012, 
and supported the initial chi square test. Taken together, these results support the 
enactment-driven performance hypothesis (see Figure 3) since, as Table 3 illustrates, 
switching from a high to a low level of interactivity resulted in a much smaller 
increase in performance than switching from a low-interactivity to a high-interactivity 
level. 
 
Table 3 
Performance Improvement in Experiments 1 and 2 Following Incubation as a 
Function of the Initial (Time 1) and Final (Time 2) Level of Interactivity 
 
 
Solution Latencies. Latency to solution were lower at Time 2 compared to 
Time 1 for those participants who had solved the problem at Time 1 (see Table 2). In 
a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA, the main effect of time was significant, F(1, 16) = 38.7, p < 
Performance improvement at Time 2
Initial interactivity level
M S.E. M S.E.
low +14% 0.03 +52% 0.04
high +3% 0.03 +25% 0.04
low high
Final interactivity level
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.001, but neither the main effect of order (high to low or low to high), F < 1, nor the 
interaction, F(1, 16) = 3.78, p = .07, were significant. Looking at how quickly 
participants solved the problem at Time 2, for those who had not solved the problem 
at Time 1, the analysis could only be conducted for participants in the low to high 
interactivity condition, since only one participant in the high to low condition solved 
the problem at Time 2. In the low to high condition, Time 2 successful participants 
were not faster than those who had solved the problem at Time 1, t(16) = -.299, p = 
.769. There was no difference in level of perseverance among participants who did 
not solve the problem at Time 1 in the high interactivity condition (M = 693 seconds, 
SD = 464) and in the low interactivity (M = 716 seconds, SD = 386) condition, t(33) = 
.16, p = .875. 
Long-term and Working Memory Performance 
Participants’ long term memory was indexed on the basis of the difference in 
their ability to recall separate ideas expressed in the Sun vignette at Times 1 and 2. 
The mean decline in performance for participants who solved, and did not solve, the 
problem at Time 2 in both interactivity conditions is reported in Table 2. Pooling the 
data across interactivity conditions, memory decline was a little less steep among 
participants who solved the problem (M = -3.45, SD = 1.76) than among those who 
did not solve the problem (M = -4.85, SD = 2.85). In a 2(solved, did not solve) × 
2(low to high, high to low) between subjects ANOVA, the main effect of having 
solved the problem, F(1, 56) = 4.22, p = .045, was significant; however, memory 
scores did not differ between experimental conditions, F< 1; the interaction between 
success and experimental condition was not significant, F< 1.  
Participants’ working memory capacity as gauged by their performance on a 
computation span test is reported in Table 2. Pooling the data across conditions, 
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participants who solved the problem generally had higher C-Span scores (M = 22.52, 
SD = 9.21) than those who did not solve the problem (M = 18.85, SD = 24.94). 
However, in a 2(solved, did not solve it) × 2(low to high, high to low) between 
subjects ANOVA, the main effect of solving the problem was not significant, F < 1, 
nor was the main effect of the experimental condition, F(1, 56) = 1.63, p = .206; the 
interaction was also not significant, F < 1. 
Experiment 2: Discussion 
In Experiment 2, participants switched from a low to a high interactivity context 
or vice versa when they encountered the problem a second time two weeks later. At 
Time 1, participants were much more likely to solve the problem in the high than the 
low interactivity condition, replicating the pattern observed in Experiment 1. The 
effect of incubation was strongest when it was realised in a high interactivity context. 
That is the solution rate among participants who first encountered the CNP in a low 
interactivity condition to then tackle the problem in the high interactivity condition 
was significantly higher than when participants tackled the problem in a low 
interactivity condition after initially working on the problem in a high interactivity 
condition. This suggests that performance at Time 2 is primarily driven by the context 
of enactment rather than by the nature of the problem representation achieved prior to 
incubation. In addition, diligence among unsuccessful participants at Time 1 in 
Experiment 2 did not differ significantly between the low and high interactivity 
condition. Pooling the data across the interactivity conditions, participants who scored 
better on the long term memory task were more likely to solve the problem at Time 2, 
suggesting that long term memory might be implicated in moderating the learning 
effect across exposure to the problem; however, working memory capacity as 
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measured with a computation span test did not differ between participants who solved 
and did not solve the problem at Time 2.  
 
General Discussion 
The present experiments investigated incubation and interactivity in problem 
solving using the CNP. In Experiment 1, participants reattempted the task with the 
same level of interactivity as with their initial encounter. In Experiment 2, participants 
reattempted the task with a different scope of action possibilities; they switched from 
low interactivity to high interactivity or high interactivity to low interactivity. As 
expected, in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, participants in the high 
interactivity conditions solved the problem more frequently than those in the low 
interactivity at Time 1. Informed by the Systemic Thinking Model (Vallée-
Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2017), we predicted that incubation would differ 
markedly as a function of the level of interactivity. This is indeed what was observed 
in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 enabled us to refine this finding by demonstrating that 
higher levels of interactivity also play a critical role in facilitating solution following 
incubation, in the realisation context. All participants who interacted with the high-
interactivity version of the CNP were able to transfer their solution to the low-
interactivity version. Meanwhile, participants who did not solve the problem in the 
initial context using a paper-and-pencil version were able to overcome their impasse 
when they could manipulate chains following a 2-week break. However, for those 
who did not overcome their impasse at Time 1 while working on a high-interactivity 
version of the CNP, incubation on a presumably richer representation of the problem 
elements did not facilitate insight when their thinking was later constrained in a 
deductive processing loop while working on a paper-and-pencil version at Time 2. 
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This finding suggests that task realism or “concreteness” cannot account for the effect 
of interactivity since having encountered the more concrete high-interactivity version 
of the CNP at Time 1 was not sufficient to promote success regardless of the 
interactivity level of the task at Time 2. This is an important finding which suggests 
that restructuring following impasse is not a purely representational process; the 
unique SysTM perspective paves the way for moving beyond comparing and 
contrasting predictions from purely internalist accounts, such as those from 
representational change theory or the criterion of satisfactory progress hypothesis, to 
consider how increasing interactivity and, by way of consequence, increasing 
reasoners’ opportunities to process perceptual inputs through physical manipulation of 
the problem elements plays a critical role in the enactment of insight.  
Future research may further distil this finding by examining more closely the 
nature of the representations created by the low-interactivity and high-interactivity 
versions of the CNP and their actual role in overcoming the impasse. The SysTM 
assumes that inductive processing results from unplanned actions driven by the 
perception of affordances. Therefore, we purposely did not use verbal protocols to 
avoid artificially forcing participants to engage in a deductive processing loop where 
they would actively plan each of their moves instead of being guided by the action 
possibilities they perceived. In other words, SysTM would predict that instructing 
participants to narrate their concurrent thought processes might reduce performance 
under high levels of interactivity as this would encourage more deductive processing, 
and limit or constraint opportunistic insights emerging from unplanned actions 
triggered by the perception of affordances.   
Likewise, SysTM would predict that a passive observation of physical 
movements (e.g., where a participant is observing another participant who attempts to 
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solve the task in a high interactivity context) would not be as successful as this would 
presumably increase the load of deliberative thinking as the observer attemps to 
uncover the intentions of the actor’s moves.      
Admittedly higher degrees of interactivity engage a number of different 
physical and cognitive processes. The relatively blunt measure of problem solving 
success reported in these experiments does not in itself identify their relative 
contributions. Future research may also explore whether, and by which processes, 
higher interactivity fosters unplanned actions and richer task representations through a 
more refined analysis of action possibilities and their impact on cognitive processes 
(see, e.g., Steffensen et al., 2016 for a probatonic analysis of another insight task, the 
17 animals problem).  
The results in the present study were in line with other results showing that 
interaction with artefacts enhances problem solving success (Fioratou & Cowley, 
2009; Vallée-Tourangeau, et al., 2015; Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2016b). The 
performance in the present experiments were considerably higher than those reported 
by Fioratou and Cowley (2009). This difference may be explained by the length of 
time permitted for participants to complete the task. Fioratou and Cowley allowed a 
maximum of 10 minutes, while participants in the experiments reported here could 
work on the problem for 30 minutes during each of the two testing sessions. 
Nonetheless, both the results of the present experiments and Fioratou and Cowley 
underscore the importance of working with a highly interactive version of the 
problem. 
If an incubation effect is in part driven by participants adopting a fresh 
perspective on the problem, we would expect long term memory scores to be higher 
for those who did not solve the problems at Time 2; however, if anything long term 
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memory scores were slightly higher among those who solved the problem at Time 2. 
In turn, while working memory capacity has been implicated in solving insight 
problems (e.g., Chuderski, 2014), the evidence is mixed (e.g., DeCaro, Van Stockum, 
& Wieth, 2016), and more important, previous work that explored problem solving in 
a high interactivity task environment found no association between working memory 
scores and solution rates with so-called insight problems (e.g., Vallée-Tourangeau et 
al., 2016b).  
The CNP remains a difficult problem to solve due to the non-obvious solution 
required, namely breaking one of the chains into its separate components to use as 
bridging links to create the full necklace. Working with a highy interactive version of 
the problem facilitates discovering the solution. Walking away from the problem is 
also a good thing. We observed here that participants who did not solve the problem 
at Time 1 were more likely to solve it at Time 2. The novel and original findings 
reported here indicate that an effect of incubation was most clearly present when 
participants worked on the problem in a high interactivity condition at Time 2. These 
findings highlight the importance of examining problem solving in different task 
environments as well as gauging incubation as a function of the scope of action 
possibilities afforded by the level of interactivity afforded by the task. Interactivity 
matters, and helps participants recognise more quickly a path to solution when they 
previously failed to solve the problem.  
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